Doing a Job 做一份工作
By Adm. Hyman G. Rickover
作者:海曼·G·里科弗上将
Admiral Hyman Rickover (1900-1986), the “Father of the Nuclear Navy,” was one of the most successful—and controversial- public managers of the 20th Century. His accomplishments are the stuff of legend. For example, in three short years, Rickover’s team designed and built the first nuclear submarine—the Nautilus—an amazing feat of engineering given that it involved the development of the first use of a controlled nuclear reactor. The Nautilus not only transformed submarine warfare, but also laid the groundwork for a whole fleet of nuclear aircraft carriers and cruisers (which was also built by Rickover and his team).
海曼·里科弗上将(1900-1986),被誉为“核海军之父”,是20世纪最成功、也最富争议的公共管理者之一。他的成就堪称传奇。例如,里科弗的团队在短短三年内设计并建造了第一艘核潜艇——鹦鹉螺号——这堪称一项令人惊叹的工程壮举,因为它涉及首次使用可控核反应堆。鹦鹉螺号不仅改变了潜艇战,还为整个核动力航空母舰和巡洋舰舰队奠定了基础(这些舰队也是由里科弗及其团队建造的)。
The text below is an excerpt from a speech Rickover delivered at Columbia University in 1982, in which he succinctly outlined his management philosophy. His determination, clarity of purpose, emphasis on developing his people, high standards, and willingness to give his people ownership of their work had to have been very inspiring. He had exceptionally high standards and was known to take some of these same strengths to extremes, however, which no doubt led to his reputation in some circles as being difficult to work for. On that cautionary note, GovLeaders.org is pleased to present Rickover’s own description of his management style.
以下文字摘自里科弗 1982 年在哥伦比亚大学的一次演讲,他在演讲中简洁地阐述了自己的管理理念。他的决心、清晰的目标、对员工发展的重视、高标准以及让员工自主工作的意愿,这些都令人深受鼓舞。然而,他拥有极高的标准,并且以将某些优点发挥到极致而闻名,这无疑导致他在某些圈子里获得了难以共事的名声。为此,GovLeaders.org 荣幸地呈现了里科弗本人对其管理风格的描述。
Human experience shows that people, not organizations or management systems, get things done. For this reason, subordinates must be given authority and responsibility early in their careers. In this way they develop quickly and can help the manager do his work. The manager, of course, remains ultimately responsible and must accept the blame if subordinates make mistakes.
人类经验表明,完成任务的是人,而不是组织或管理系统。因此,下属必须在职业生涯早期就被赋予权力和责任。这样,他们才能快速发展,并协助经理开展工作。当然,经理最终仍需承担责任,如果下属犯错,必须承担责任。
As subordinates develop, work should be constantly added so that no one can finish his job. This serves as a prod and a challenge. It brings out their capabilities and frees the manager to assume added responsibilities. As members of the organization become capable of assuming new and more difficult duties, they develop pride in doing the job well. This attitude soon permeates the entire organization.
随着下属的成长,工作应该不断增加,确保没有人能够完成自己的工作。这既是一种激励,也是一种挑战。它能激发他们的能力,让管理者有更多时间承担更多责任。随着组织成员逐渐能够承担新的、更艰巨的任务,他们会对出色地完成工作感到自豪。这种态度很快就会渗透到整个组织。
One must permit his people the freedom to seek added work and greater responsibility. In my organization, there are no formal job descriptions or organizational charts. Responsibilities are defined in a general way, so that people are not circumscribed. All are permitted to do as they think best and to go to anyone and anywhere for help. Each person then is limited only by his own ability.
必须允许员工自由地寻求额外的工作和更大的责任。在我的组织里,没有正式的职位描述或组织结构图。职责以通用的方式定义,这样人们就不会受到限制。每个人都可以做自己认为最好的事情,并可以向任何人、任何地方寻求帮助。这样一来,每个人只受自身能力的限制。
Complex jobs cannot be accomplished effectively with transients. Therefore, a manager must make the work challenging and rewarding so that his people will remain with the organization for many years. This allows it to benefit fully from their knowledge, experience, and corporate memory.
复杂的工作无法依靠临时员工有效完成。因此,管理者必须赋予工作挑战性和回报,以便员工能够在组织中长期留任。这样,组织才能充分利用他们的知识、经验和企业记忆。
The Defense Department does not recognize the need for continuity in important jobs. It rotates officer every few years both at headquarters and in the field. The same applies to their civilian superiors.
国防部不承认重要职位保持连续性的必要性。它每隔几年就会在总部和实地轮换军官。他们的文职上司也是如此。
This system virtually ensures inexperience and nonaccountability. By the time an officer has begun to learn a job, it is time for him to rotate. Under this system, incumbents can blame their problems on predecessors. They are assigned to another job before the results of their work become evident. Subordinates cannot be expected to remain committed to a job and perform effectively when they are continuously adapting to a new job or to a new boss.
这种制度实际上导致了经验不足和不负责任。当一名警官开始学习一项工作时,就到了轮换的时候了。在这种制度下,现任警官可以把自己的问题归咎于前任。他们的工作成果尚未显现,就被调往其他岗位。如果下属不断适应新工作或新上司,就不可能指望他们能始终忠于原职并高效工作。
When doing a job—any job—one must feel that he owns it, and act as though he will remain in the job forever. He must look after his work just as conscientiously, as though it were his own business and his own money. If he feels he is only a temporary custodian, or that the job is just a stepping stone to a higher position, his actions will not take into account the long-term interests of the organization. His lack of commitment to the present job will be perceived by those who work for him, and they, likewise, will tend not to care. Too many spend their entire working lives looking for their next job. When one feels he owns his present job and acts that way, he need have no concern about his next job.
无论从事什么工作,一个人都必须感到自己是这份工作的主人 ,并且要像永远从事这份工作一样对待它。他必须像对待自己的事业和金钱一样认真负责地对待自己的工作。如果他只是暂时的看管人,或者觉得这份工作只是通往更高职位的垫脚石,那么他的行为就不会考虑组织的长远利益。他对目前工作的缺乏投入会被他的下属察觉到,而他们同样往往不会在意。太多人毕生都在寻找下一份工作。当一个人感到自己是这份工作的主人,并且这样做的时候,他就无需担心下一份工作了。
In accepting responsibility for a job, a person must get directly involved. Every manager has a personal responsibility not only to find problems but to correct them. This responsibility comes before all other obligations, before personal ambition or comfort.
一个人在承担工作责任时,必须直接参与其中。每位管理者都有责任发现问题,并纠正问题。这项责任高于所有其他义务,高于个人野心或安逸。
A major flaw in our system of government, and even in industry, is the latitude allowed to do less than is necessary. Too often officials are willing to accept and adapt to situations they know to be wrong. The tendency is to downplay problems instead of actively trying to correct them. Recognizing this, many subordinates give up, contain their views within themselves, and wait for others to take action. When this happens, the manager is deprived of the experience and ideas of subordinates who generally are more knowledgeable than he in their particular areas.
我们的政府体制,甚至在工业界,一个重大缺陷就是允许做不到位。官员们常常愿意接受并适应他们明知是错误的情况。这种倾向倾向于淡化问题,而不是积极尝试纠正。意识到这一点,许多下属选择放弃,将自己的观点藏在心里,等待他人采取行动。当这种情况发生时,管理者就无法获得下属的经验和想法,而这些下属通常在特定领域比他更有知识。
A manager must instill in his people an attitude of personal responsibility for seeing a job properly accomplished. Unfortunately, this seems to be declining, particularly in large organizations where responsibility is broadly distributed. To complaints of a job poorly done, one often hears the excuse, “I am not responsible.” I believe that is literally correct. The man who takes such a stand in fact is not responsible; he is irresponsible. While he may not be legally liable, or the work may not have been specifically assigned to him, no one involved in a job can divest himself of responsibility for its successful completion.
管理者必须向员工灌输一种个人责任感,确保工作得到妥善完成。不幸的是,这种责任感似乎正在减弱,尤其是在责任分散的大型组织中。对于工作做得不好的投诉,人们常常听到这样的借口:“我没有责任。” 我相信这完全正确。持这种立场的人实际上不负责任;他是不负责任的。虽然他可能不承担法律责任,或者工作可能没有被明确分配给他,但任何参与工作的人都不能推卸对工作顺利完成的责任。
Unless the individual truly responsible can be identified when something goes wrong, no one has really been responsible. With the advent of modern management theories it is becoming common for organizations to deal with problems in a collective manner, by dividing programs into subprograms, with no one left responsible for the entire effort. There is also the tendency to establish more and more levels of management, on the theory that this gives better control. These are but different forms of shared responsibility, which easily lead to no one being responsible—a problems that often inheres in large corporations as well as in the Defense Department.
除非在出现问题时能够确定真正负责的个人,否则实际上没有人承担责任。随着现代管理理论的出现,组织越来越普遍地采用集体方式处理问题,将项目划分为子项目,没有人负责整个项目。此外,还有一种趋势是建立越来越多的管理层级,理由是这样做可以更好地控制。这些只是责任共担的不同形式,很容易导致无人负责——这个问题在大型公司以及国防部中都经常存在。
When I came to Washington before World War II to head the electrical section of the Bureau of Ships, I found that one man was in charge of design, another of production, a third handled maintenance, while a fourth dealt with fiscal matters. The entire bureau operated that way. It didn’t make sense to me. Design problems showed up in production, production errors showed up in maintenance, and financial matters reached into all areas. I changed the system. I made one man responsible for his entire area of equipment—for design, production, maintenance, and contracting. If anything went wrong, I knew exactly at whom to point. I run my present organization on the same principle.
二战前,我来到华盛顿,担任船舶局电气部门主管。当时,我发现一个人负责设计,另一个人负责生产,第三个人负责维护,还有一个人负责财务。整个局都是这样运作的。我觉得这很不合理。设计问题出现在生产中,生产失误出现在维护中,财务问题蔓延到各个领域。我改变了这个系统。我让一个人负责他负责的整个设备领域——设计、生产、维护和承包。如果出了什么问题,我清楚地知道该找谁。我现在的机构也是按照同样的原则运作的。
A good manager must have unshakeable determination and tenacity. Deciding what needs to be done is easy, getting it done is more difficult. Good ideas are not adopted automatically. They must be driven into practice with courageous impatience. Once implemented they can be easily overturned or subverted through apathy or lack of follow-up, so a continuous effort is required. Too often, important problems are recognized but no one is willing to sustain the effort needed to solve them.
优秀的管理者必须拥有坚定不移的决心和毅力。决定做什么很容易,但真正去做却更难。好的想法不会自动被采纳,必须以勇敢的耐心付诸实践。一旦付诸实践,很容易因为冷漠或缺乏后续行动而被推翻或破坏,因此需要持续的努力。很多时候,人们意识到了重要的问题,但却没有人愿意持续付出解决它们所需的努力。
Nothing worthwhile can be accomplished without determination. In the early days of nuclear power, for example, getting approval to build the first nuclear submarine—the Nautilus—was almost as difficult as designing and building it. Many in the Navy opposed building a nuclear submarine.
没有决心,任何有价值的事情都无法完成。例如,在核能发展的早期,获得建造第一艘核潜艇“鹦鹉螺号”( Nautilus )的批准几乎与设计和建造它一样困难。海军中许多人反对建造核潜艇。
In the same way, the Navy once viewed nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and cruisers as too expensive, despite their obvious advantages of unlimited cruising range and ability to remain at sea without vulnerable support ships. Yet today our nuclear submarine fleet is widely recognized as our nation’s most effective deterrent to nuclear war. Our nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and cruisers have proven their worth by defending our interests all over the world—even in remote trouble spots such as the Indian Ocean, where the capability of oil-fired ships would be severely limited by their dependence on fuel supplies.
同样,尽管核动力航空母舰和巡洋舰拥有无限航程和无需脆弱支援舰艇即可在海上持续航行的明显优势,但海军曾一度认为它们过于昂贵。然而,如今我们的核潜艇舰队已被广泛认可为我国最有效的核战争威慑力量。我们的核动力航空母舰和巡洋舰已证明了其价值,它们在世界各地保卫着我们的利益——即使在印度洋这样偏远的动乱地区,燃油舰艇的能力也会因依赖燃料供应而受到严重限制。
The man in charge must concern himself with details. If he does not consider them important, neither will his subordinates. Yet “the devil is in the details.” It is hard and monotonous to pay attention to seemingly minor matters. In my work, I probably spend about ninety-nine percent of my time on what others may call petty details. Most managers would rather focus on lofty policy matters. But when the details are ignored, the project fails. No infusion of policy or lofty ideals can then correct the situation.
负责人必须关注细节。如果他不重视细节,他的下属也不会重视。然而,“细节决定成败”。关注看似微不足道的小事既困难又单调。在我的工作中,我大概有99%的时间都花在了别人所谓的琐碎细节上。大多数管理者宁愿专注于宏大的政策问题。但如果忽视细节,项目就会失败。无论注入什么政策或崇高的理想,都无法扭转局面。
To maintain proper control one must have simple and direct means to find out what is going on. There are many ways of doing this; all involve constant drudgery. For this reason those in charge often create “management information systems” designed to extract from the operation the details a busy executive needs to know. Often the process is carried too far. The top official then loses touch with his people and with the work that is actually going on.
为了保持适当的控制,必须有简单直接的方法来了解正在发生的事情。实现这一点的方法有很多,但都需要持续不断的繁重工作。因此,负责人经常创建“管理信息系统”,旨在从运营中提取繁忙高管需要了解的细节。然而,这个过程往往被过度延伸。高层官员因此与员工以及实际进行的工作失去了联系。
Attention to detail does not require a manager to do everything himself. No one can work more than twenty-four hours each day. Therefore to multiply his efforts, he must create an environment where his subordinates can work to their maximum ability. Some management experts advocate strict limits to the number of people reporting to a common superior—generally five to seven. But if one has capable people who require but a few moments of his time during the day, there is no reason to set such arbitrary constraints. Some forty key people report frequently and directly to me. This enables me to keep up with what is going on and makes it possible for them to get fast action. The latter aspect is particularly important. Capable people will not work for long where they cannot get prompt decisions and actions from their superior.
关注细节并不意味着经理事必躬亲。没有人能够每天工作超过二十四小时。因此,为了事半功倍,他必须创造一个让下属能够充分发挥其能力的环境。一些管理专家主张严格限制向同一上级汇报的人数——通常是五到七人。但如果公司拥有一些能力出众的员工,而他们一天只需要占用公司很少的时间,那么就没有理由设置如此武断的限制。大约有四十位关键员工经常直接向我汇报工作。这使我能够及时了解情况,并使他们能够迅速采取行动。后者尤为重要。如果无法从上级那里得到迅速的决策和行动,有能力的员工也无法长期工作。
I require frequent reports, both oral and written, from many key people in the nuclear program. These include the commanding officers of our nuclear ships, those in charge of our schools and laboratories, and representatives at manufacturers’ plants and commercial shipyards. I insist they report the problems they have found directly to me—and in plain English. This provides them unlimited flexibility in subject matter—something that often is not accommodated in highly structured management systems—and a way to communicate their problems and recommendations to me without having them filtered through others. The Defense Department, with its excessive layers of management, suffers because those at the top who make decisions are generally isolated from their subordinates, who have the first-hand knowledge.
我要求核计划的许多关键人员经常提交口头和书面汇报。这些汇报包括我们核动力舰艇的指挥官、学校和实验室的负责人,以及制造商工厂和商业船厂的代表。我坚持要求他们直接向我汇报发现的问题,而且要用通俗易懂的英语。这为他们提供了无限的议题灵活性——这在高度结构化的管理系统中往往难以实现——也为他们提供了一种无需经过他人筛选就能向我传达问题和建议的途径。国防部管理层级过高,这导致决策层级通常与掌握第一手信息的下属隔绝,从而导致问题频发。
To do a job effectively, one must set priorities. Too many people let their “in” basket set the priorities. On any given day, unimportant but interesting trivia pass through an office; one must not permit these to monopolize his time. The human tendency is to while away time with unimportant matters that do not require mental effort or energy. Since they can be easily resolved, they give a false sense of accomplishment. The manager must exert self-discipline to ensure that his energy is focused where it is truly needed.
要想高效地完成工作,必须设定优先顺序。太多人让“待办事项”篮子设定了优先顺序。办公室里每天都会有一些无关紧要但又有趣的琐事;管理者绝不能让这些琐事占据自己的时间。人们倾向于把时间浪费在那些不需要耗费脑力或精力的无关紧要的事情上。由于这些事情很容易解决,它们会给人一种虚假的成就感。管理者必须自律,确保将精力集中在真正需要的地方。
All work should be checked through an independent and impartial review. In engineering and manufacturing, industry spends large sums on quality control. But the concept of impartial reviews and oversight is important in other areas also. Even the most dedicated individual makes mistakes—and many workers are less than dedicated. I have seen much poor work and sheer nonsense generated in government and in industry because it was not checked properly.
所有工作都应经过独立公正的审查。在工程和制造业,企业在质量控制上投入了大量资金。但公正的审查和监督在其他领域也同样重要。即使是最敬业的人也会犯错——很多工人甚至不那么敬业。我见过政府和企业因为没有得到适当的审查而产生许多低劣的工作和纯粹的胡闹。
One must create the ability in his staff to generate clear, forceful arguments for opposing viewpoints as well as for their own. Open discussions and disagreements must be encouraged, so that all sides of an issue will be fully explored. Further, important issues should be presented in writing. Nothing so sharpens the thought process as writing down one’s arguments. Weaknesses overlooked in oral discussion become painfully obvious on the written page.
必须培养员工清晰有力地论证自身观点和反对观点的能力。必须鼓励公开讨论和表达不同意见,以便充分探讨问题的各个方面。此外,重要问题应以书面形式提出。没有什么比写下自己的论点更能激发思维了。口头讨论中被忽视的弱点,在书面上会变得显而易见。
When important decisions are not documented, one becomes dependent on individual memory, which is quickly lost as people leave or move to other jobs. In my work, it is important to be able to go back a number of years to determine the facts that were considered in arriving at a decision. This makes it easier to resolve new problems by putting them into proper perspective. It also minimizes the risk of repeating past mistakes. Moreover if important communications and actions are not documented clearly, one can never be sure they were understood or even executed.
如果重要决策没有记录,人们就会依赖个人记忆,而随着人们离职或调动,个人记忆很快就会消失。在我的工作中,能够回顾多年前做出决策时考虑的事实至关重要。这样,通过正确的视角,我们就能更容易地解决新问题,并最大程度地降低重蹈覆辙的风险。此外,如果重要的沟通和行动没有清晰的记录,人们永远无法确定它们是否被理解甚至执行。
It is a human inclination to hope things will work out, despite evidence or doubt to the contrary. A successful manager must resist this temptation. This is particularly hard if one has invested much time and energy on a project and thus has come to feel possessive about it. Although it is not easy to admit what a person once thought correct now appears to be wrong, one must discipline himself to face the facts objectively and make the necessary changes—regardless of the consequences to himself. The man in charge must personally set the example in this respect. He must be able, in effect, to “kill his own child” if necessary and must require his subordinates to do likewise. I have had to go to Congress and, because of technical problems, recommended terminating a project that had been funded largely on my say-so. It is not a pleasant task, but one must be brutally objective in his work.
人类倾向于希望事情会顺利,即使证据或怀疑与此相反。成功的管理者必须抵制这种诱惑。如果一个人在一个项目上投入了大量的时间和精力,并因此对它产生了占有欲,这一点就尤其困难。虽然承认自己曾经认为正确的事情现在看来是错误的并不容易,但一个人必须约束自己客观面对事实,并做出必要的改变——无论后果如何。在这方面,负责人必须以身作则。他实际上必须能够在必要时“杀死自己的孩子”,并且必须要求他的下属也这样做。我曾经因为技术问题不得不去国会,建议终止一个主要由我主导资助的项目。这并非一项令人愉快的任务,但一个人在工作中必须保持绝对的客观性。
No management system can substitute for hard work. A manager who does not work hard or devote extra effort cannot expect his people to do so. He must set the example. The manager may not be the smartest or the most knowledgeable person, but if he dedicates himself to the job and devotes the required effort, his people will follow his lead.
任何管理制度都无法取代辛勤工作。一个不努力工作或不付出额外努力的管理者,就不能指望他的员工也这样做。他必须以身作则。这位管理者或许不是最聪明或最博学的人,但如果他全身心投入工作,并付出必要的努力,他的员工就会效仿他。
The ideas I have mentioned are not new—previous generations recognized the value of hard work, attention to detail, personal responsibility, and determination. And these, rather than the highly-touted modern management techniques, are still the most important in doing a job. Together they embody a common-sense approach to management, one that cannot be taught by professors of management in a classroom.
我提到的这些理念并非新鲜事物——前几代人认识到勤奋工作、注重细节、个人责任感和决心的价值。这些,而非那些被大肆宣扬的现代管理技巧,仍然是工作中最重要的因素。它们共同体现了一种常识性的管理方法,这种方法是管理学教授在课堂上无法传授的。
I am not against business education. A knowledge of accounting, finance, business law, and the like can be of value in a business environment. What I do believe is harmful is the impression often created by those who teach management that one will be able to manage any job by applying certain management techniques together with some simple academic rules of how to manage people and situations.
我并不反对商业教育。会计、金融、商法等知识在商业环境中确实很有价值。我认为真正有害的是那些教授管理学的人经常给人留下的印象:只要运用某些管理技巧,再加上一些关于如何管理人和情况的简单学术规则,就能管理好任何工作。